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LIABILITY FOR HIGH SEAS OIL
POLLUTION CLEANUP COSTS: DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS
by GERALD CLAUSEN
Member of the Class of 1981
I. THE PROBLEM OF VESSEL-SOURCE OIL
POLLUTION OF THE SEA
Estimates of annual loss of oil to the sea from marine sources
range from one to two million tons annually.' Discharges from ships
represent about one-third of this pollution.2 Most of these discharges
are "operational discharges"--for example, oily water discharged dur-
ing deballasting and tank washing. But accidental discharges account
for an estimated 257,000 tons of annual oil pollution, and often cause
the most immediate, traumatic and widespread damage to the marine
environment.4
The cost of cleaning up accidental spills accounts for a large por-
tion of the measurable damages, and usually goes uncompensated. In
1967, the oil tanker Torrey Canyon went aground 14 miles off the Brit-
ish coast, spilling 60,000 to 80,000 tons of oil. Both British and French
beaches were polluted, some as far as 225 miles away. The actual
cleanup costs exceeded $16 million; the tanker owner's settlement for
cleanup costs amounted to $7.2 million. Similarly, in 1978 the Amoco
Cadiz spilled 65 million gallons of oil off the coast of Brittany. Esti-
1. D. ABECASSIS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS
4 (1978).
2. Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1977" Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comnm on Environment and Publlc JVorkls,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 524 (1977) (statement of Gus Speth). [Hereinafter cited as FJPfCA
Amendment Hearings.]
3. D. ABEcAssls, supra note 1, Table 1.1 at 4.
4. For studies of the potential effects of oil on the marine environment, see Bissell,
Intervention on the High Seas an American Approach Employng Community Standards, 7 J.
OF MAR. L. & COM. 718 (1976); Harwood, Oil and IVater, HARPER'S, Sept. 1978, at 43.
5. Emanuelli, The Right of Intervention of Coastal States on the High Seas in Cases of
Pollution Casualties, 25 U. OF NEW BRUNSWICK L.. 79 1976; Note, Liabilityfor 1Pollution
Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L REv. 973 (1970).
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mates of cleanup costs ranged upwards of $60 million.6 Under interna-
tional agreements, the owners' liability for cleanup costs came to $17.2
million.7
Fortunately, such spectacular tanker accidents are relatively rare,
and account for only a small percentage of the world's oil pollution.'
But they serve as shocking and necessary reminders of the need for
greater control of the pollution of water. They also illustrate the need
for more effective compensatory schemes for damage victims.
II. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO
THE PROBLEM
It was not until the Torrey Canyon incident that the international
community was sufficiently provoked into a serious re-examination of
international law concerning vessel-source oil pollution, particularly in
connection with activities on the high seas. The Torrey Canyon was
under Liberian register and had run aground on the high seas outside
British territorial waters. Serious questions were raised concerning the
existence and scope of a coastal state's power to intervene under such
circumstances when Britain unilaterally undertook to mitigate pollu-
tion by bombing the grounded tanker from the air.9 Prior to that time,
the rights and interests of third parties (including coastal states) had
been of only incidental importance under international law.10 Since
then, however, "the cause of the coastal state has been paramount,""
with the focus being on: 1) the scope of the coastal state's power to
intervene when a maritime casualty threatens oil pollution, and 2) the
right of the coastal state to be compensated for pollution damage. 12
Largely in response to the Torrey Canyon disaster, the Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), an agency of
the United Nations, sponsored an international conference in Brussels
in 1969 to consider the legal problems of maritime casualties resulting
in oil pollution. The 1969 IMCO conference produced two interna-
tional conventions: The International Convention Relating to Inter-
6. NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1978, at 11.
7. Id.
8. According to one estimate, tanker accidents account for 12.6% of the total estimated
annual oil loss to the sea from ships and offshore facilities. D. ABECASSiS, supra note 1,
Table 1.1 at 4.
9. Emanuelli, supra note 5, at 79-80.
10. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
145 (1979).
11. Id. at 143.
12. Id.
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vention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,' 3 and the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Dam-
age,' 4 commonly referred to as the Civil Liability Convention.
The Intervention Convention provides a coastal state with a lim-
ited right of intervention on the high seas when a maritime casualty
threatens its territorial interests. The United States became a party to
the Intervention Convention in 1974 and enacted implementing legisla-
tion in the form of the Intervention on the High Seas Act t5 in the same
year. The United States failed, however, to ratify the Civil Liability
Convention, which provided for limited liability on the part of a tanker
owner for oil pollution damage-including situations where such dam-
age included the cost of preventive measures undertaken on the high
seas by the coastal state.
Ostensibly, the United States primary dissatisfaction with the Civil
Liability Convention was its concern that the Convention's monetary
limits on liability were too low.' 6 The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act 7 already imposed liability for government cleanup costs on the
owner or operator of a vessel discharging oil into the "navigable waters
of the United States,""' which include the territorial waters but not the
high seas.' 9 Thus, non-ratification of the Civil Liability Convention
meant that the United States remained without a statutory remedy to
recover its costs of cleaning up oil pollution resulting from a high seas
maritime casualty.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was amended in 1977 by
13. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualities, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Intervention Convention].
14. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pullution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, reprinted in 9 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability
Convention]. The Civil Liability Convention entered into force on June 19, 1975. As of
Nov. 1977, twenty-eight States were parties to the Convention.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471 etseq. (1976).
16. See FWPCA Amendment Hearings, supra note 2, at 518 (statement of Lindsey
Grant). Previously, ratification had been urged by both President Ford (Special Message to
the Congress Proposing Oil Pollution Legislation, PUB. PAPERS 944, 945 (July 9, 1975) and
President Nixon (Special Message to the Congress on Marine Pollution from Oil Spills, PUB.
PAPERS 443, 444 (May 20, 1970)).
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976).
18. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b), (f) (1976).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." "Territorial seas" are "the belt of the seas measured from the
line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the
open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a
distance of three miles." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (1976).
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the Clean Water Act.2 0 Among other things, the Clean Water Act ex-
tended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's owner-operator lia-
bility provisions to encompass expenses incurred by the government in
taking intervention measures pursuant to the Intervention on the High
Seas Act or the Intervention Convention.2' Congress in effect had pro-
vided at least a partial answer to the Civil Liability Convention.
As noted,22 the United States' non-ratification of the Civil Liabil-
ity Convention was motivated primarily by dissatisfaction with the
monetary limits established by the Convention rather than dissatisfac-
tion with the Convention's substantive provisions imposing liability for
oil discharges. Nevertheless, although the liability-imposing provisions
of the Convention are similar to those enacted by Congress in the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, they are by no means identical. In
other words, the two liability regimes differ not only in their answers to
the question of how much may be recovered, but also in their answers to
the threshold question of whether recovery may be had at all.
This note examines the latter difference by comparing the circum-
stances under which the Civil Liability Convention and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act impose liability to the government for the
recovery of its costs incurred in cleaning up oil pollution following
upon a high seas maritime casualty. The analysis focuses on differ-
ences in the circumstances under which liability arises and the types of
damages recoverable under each liability scheme. The analysis dis-
closes that the approaches to the problem taken by the Convention and
the Act are similar and the differences between them few. Certain of
the differences, however, are quite significant. In view of the fact that
the Americans declined to ratify the Civil Liability Convention on the
asserted ground that the Convention did not go far enough in the
amount of recovery it would allow, it is ironic to discover that the anal-
ysis yields the conclusion that the Convention provides for recovery
from the owner of a high seas tanker casualty in more situations than
does the Act.
20. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified in scattered
sections of 33, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
21. Id. at § 58(c)(2), 91 Stat. 1566, 1594.
22. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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I. THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION: BASIC
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERVENTION ON THE
HIGH SEAS ACT
The Intervention on the High Seas Act represents the United
States' implementation of the Intervention Convention, and its provi-
sions are, with the exception of necessary domestic idiosyncracies, sub-
stantially similar to those of the Intervention Convention.
The Act authorizes intervention to prevent, mitigate or eliminate
pollution danger only under specific, limited circumstances. There
must be 1) a maritime casualty, 2) resulting in actual or imminently
threatened material damage, 3) creating a grave and imminent danger
to coastline interests, 4) from actual or threatened oil pollution, 5)
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful conse-
quences. 3 The nature of intervention authorized is limited to measures
taken on the high seas. Such measures include: 1) coordinating and
directing all public and private efforts directed at the elimination or
removal of the threatened oil pollution damage, 2) directly or indirectly
undertaking the whole or any part of any salvage, and 3) removing
and, if necessary, destroying the ship and cargo. 4 Moreover, the meas-
ures must be "proportionate to the damage, actual or threatened...
and may not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to prevent, miti-
gate, or eliminate that damage,"25 and the United States is obligated to
pay compensation to the extent of any damage caused by intervention
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1978). This section provides in material part:
Whenever a ship collision, stranding, or other incident of navigation or other oc-
currence on board a ship or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent
threat of material damage to the ship or her cargo creates, as determined by the
Secretary, a grave and imminent danger to the coastline or related interests of the
United States from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by convention
oil. . .which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences,
the Secretary may.. .take measures on the high seas.. .to prevent, mitigate, or
eliminate that danger.
"Secretary" refers to the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
33 U.S.C. § 1471(4) (1978), presently, the Department of Transportation. "Convention oil"
means crude, fuel, diesel and lubricating oil. 33 U.S.C. § 1471(3) (1978). The Intervention
on the High Seas Act also applies to pollution dangers from "a substance other than conven-
tion oil," which refers to substances enumerated in the 1973 Protocol Relating to Interven-
tion on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other Than Oil, Nov. 2,
1973 reprinted in 13 INt'L LEGAL MATERIALS 605 (1973), as well as to any other substances
determined by the Secretary to be hazardous under 33 U.S.C. § 1473(a) 33 U.S.C. § 1471(1)
(1978).
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1474(1)-(3) (1976).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1477(a) (1976).
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action which is not reasonably necessary.26 Factors to be considered in
determining the proportion of the intervention measures to the actual
or threatened damage include, but are not limited to: 1) the extent and
probability of imminent danger if the measures are not taken, 2) the
likelihood of effectiveness of the particular measures, and 3) the extent
of the damage which may be caused by the measures.27
Prior to taking any intervention action, the Secretary is required to
consult with other affected states (especially the ship's flag state),28 and
to notify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and any known persons whose interests "can reasonably be expected to
be affected by any proposed measures, ' 29 and consider any views sub-
mitted in response to such consultation and notification. 30 Consulta-
tion and notification are excused to the extent that cases of extreme
urgency require immediate action.31
Intervention may not be exercised in the case of warships or other
ships owned and operated by a State and being used only on govern-
mental non-commercial service.32 Finally, the Intervention on the
High Seas Act is to be interpreted and administered consistently with
the Intervention Convention and other international law. 33
It is widely believed that the Intervention Convention merely codi-
fied the existing international customary law doctrine of self-protec-
tion,34 and neither created new rights in the coastal state nor enlarged
those previously existing. This is consistent with the Preamble's twin
themes of necessity and protection,35 and probably reflects in part the
concern of several IMCO members that any unnecessary encroach-
ments on shipping operations should be avoided.36 Consequently,
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1479(a) (1976).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1477(b) (1976).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1475(1) (1976).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1475(2) (1976).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1475(3) (1976).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1476 (1976).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1483 (1976).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1484 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Bissell, supra note 4; Emanuelli, supra note 5.
35. The Preamble to the Intervention Convention reads in part:
CONSCIOUS of the need to protect the interests of their people against the grave
consequences of a maritime casualty resulting in danger of oil pollution of sea and
coastlines,
CONVINCED that under these circumstances measures of an exceptional charac-
ter to protect such interests might be necessary on the high seas and that these
measures do not affect the principle of freedom of the high seas. Intervention Con-
vention, supra note 13.
36. M'GolirGLE & ZACHER, supra note 10, at 160.
[Vol. 3
High Seas Oil Pollution
coastal states have authority to take only limited steps to protect their
interests from pollution danger when the exigencies of a maritime casu-
alty so require.
The Intervention on the High Seas Act became effective on May 6,
1975, the date the Intervention Convention was brought into force.37
There are as yet no reported cases interpreting its provisions. Its au-
thority, however, was invoked in the 1976 Argo Merchant incident
when the United States intervened to direct cleanup operations after
the tanker went aground 27 miles off Nantucket Island spilling her en-
tire 7.5 million gallon oil cargo into the sea.3
8
IV. LIABILITY FOR THE COST OF INTERVENTION
MEASURES UNDER THE CIVIL LIABILITY
CONVENTION AND THE FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT
A. Circumstances Under Which Liability Will Be Imposed Upon an
Owner or Operator
The respective geographical scopes of the Civil Liability Conven-
tion and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are not coextensive.
Article II of the Civil Liability Convention limits the geographical
scope of its application: "This Convention shall apply exclusively to
pollution damage caused on the territory including the territorial sea of
a Contracting State and to preventive measures taken to prevent or
minimize such damage." Although its language is not entirely clear,
this article "should be interpreted to mean that preventive measures
taken on the high seas to control damage which could occur in the terri-
torial seas are subject to compensation, as are preventive measures and
damages inside the territorial seas."39
Thus, it is possible for the owner of a vessel discharging oil to be-
come liable to a noncontracting state if the noncontracting state under-
takes measures to prevent or mitigate damage to the territory of a
contracting state. The scope of liability in this respect has been illus-
trated as follows: "[I]f a ship goes aground on the high seas and oil
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1487 (1978). See also Intervention Convention, .wpra note 13, art.
Xi §1.
38. FWPCA Amendment Hearings, supra note 2, at 518 (statement of iUndsey Grant);
Hearings on S. 182, S. 568, S. 682, S. 715, andS. 898 before the Senate Cont on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., Ist Sss. 866 (1977) (statement of Patsy Mink).
39. M'GONIGLE & ZACHER, supra note 10, at 174 (emphasis in original).
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pollutes the shores of State A (a non-contracting party), the Convention
will apply only to the former damage. ... Additionally, reasonable
preventive measures taken on the high seas or on the territorial sea of
State A or B and designed to prevent or minimize pollution damage in
State A are covered, irrespective of who took them."40 As a noncon-
tracting party, the United States would be entitled to compensation
under the Civil Liability Convention only to the extent that it inter-
vened to prevent or mitigate damage to the territory of a contracting
state.
Section 1321(f)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act sub-
jects the owner or operator to liability for government costs if oil is
discharged "into or upon the navigable waters of the United States,
adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous
zone. . . ., The Clean Water Act amendments broadened the scope
of the liability by providing that "[any expense incurred. . . under the
Intervention on the High Seas Act (or the [Intervention Convention])
shall be a cost incurred by the United States Government for the pur-
poses of subsection (f) in the removal of oil. ... "'
In short, the Civil Liability Convention covers any action taken to
minimize damage to a contracting state, irrespective of where or by
whom it is taken. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, on the
other hand, covers only measures taken by the government either 1) on
the high seas, or 2) in response to a discharge into or upon the waters of
the United States. The most prominent situation not covered by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act would be the case where dis-
charge is made into or upon the high seas, but cleanup measures are
taken on territorial waters. Such a situation would clearly be covered
by the Civil Liability Convention, and it seems somewhat anomalous
that the government has provided itself with a statutory remedy for
recovering its cost in cleaning up the high seas, but not for recovering
its cost in cleaning up its own territorial waters when a discharge
originates on the high seas.
The two liability regimes also differ with respect to the scope of the
class each seeks to protect. The Civil Liability Convention imposes lia-
bility "for any pollution damage caused by oil" discharged as a result
of the incident.4 3 "Pollution damage" includes the costs of preventive
40. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 1, at 181 (footnote omitted).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1978).
42. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1978).
43. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 1.
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measures,44 and "preventive measures" are "any reasonable measures
taken by any person" to prevent or minimize damage4 5 The protected
class therefore includes private individuals as well as governments. In
contrast, under section 1321(f)(1) the protected class is restricted exclu-
sively to the government. Section 1321(0(1) explicitly provides that the
owner or operator shall "be liable to the United States Government"
for actual cleanup costs incurred "by the United States Government."
Two other differences between the Civil Liability Convention and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are of significance. The Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act imposes liability on the "owner or
operator of any vessel" discharging oil16 An "owner or operator" in-
cludes "any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise
. . . -47 The Act thus provides the government with the option of pur-
suing either the owner or the demise charterer, if there is one. The
Civil Liability Convention, on the other hand, limits liability to the
owner.
48
The second difference concerns the type of vessel which discharges
oil. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act applies to virtually any
sea-going vessel.49 The Civil Liability Convention, however, is re-
stricted to vessels "actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo."5 0 This re-
striction is of immense significance because it greatly reduces the
number of situations to which the Convention will apply. The restric-
tion limits imposition of liability not merely to oil tankers, but to tank-
ers actually carrying oil as cargo at the time of discharge.-' It has been
estimated that over 75% of the annual oil loss to the sea from ships and
offshore installations is due to operational discharges-that is, debal-
lasting, tank washing, and tank-washing pre-maintenance.5 Since
these activities take place only after oil cargoes have been unloaded,
they are not covered by the Convention.
With respect to maritime casualties on the high seas, however, this
44. Id. art. I,§ 6.
45. Id. art. I, § 6. (emphasis added). "Person" includes any individual or partnership,
or any public or private body, whether corporate or not, including a State. Id. art. I, § 2.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1978).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6) (1976).
48. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. I, § 3. "Owner" means the registered
owner, or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons owning the ship, except that
"owner" may mean a company operating a State-owned ship if the company is registered as
the ship's operator in that State. Id.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(3) (1976).
50. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
51. See D. ABECASSIS, supra note I, at 109.
52. See id. Table 1.1 at 4.
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difference between the Act and the Convention appears to be of little
practical significance. Accidental discharges from oil-cargo vessels ac-
count for about 15 percent of the oil pollution from ships and offshore
installations, while such discharges from other ships account for less
than one percent.53 Since neither the Intervention on the High Seas
Act nor the Intervention Convention authorize coastal state interven-
tion for mere operational discharges, the Civil Liability Convention's
restricted application to oil-carrying tankers appears to be of little prac-
tical significance in the situation under consideration here.
In sum, ignoring for the moment the effect of certain exceptions to
liability available under the Civil Liability Convention and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, the Convention is more liberal than the
Act in imposing liability in two respects: 1) it allows compensation for
the costs of cleanup measures undertaken on territorial waters to re-
move oil discharged on the high seas, and 2) it allows compensation of
persons other than the government who act to prevent or minimize pol-
lution damage. Conversely, the Act is more liberal in imposing liability
to the extent that 1) it allows the government to seek recovery from the
operator of the vessel as well as its owner and 2) it allows recovery
when oil is discharged by a ship not actually carrying oil as cargo. Of
the four differences between the two regimes, the last is probably the
most significant. However, the fact that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act apparently makes no provision for removing from territo-
rial waters oil discharged on the high seas may prove equally signifi-
cant. This is particularly true since intervention on the high seas is
authorized only when there is a "grave and imminent danger to [the
coastal state's] coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of
pollution. . ... 54 It may often occur that by the time high seas inter-
vention measures are authorized, it will be too late entirely to prevent
contamination of territorial waters.
B. Circumstances Under Which an Owner or Operator May Avoid
Liability
Both the Civil Liability Convention and the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act provide for four similar classes of events which can
operate to exempt a shipowner from liability. Section 1321(f)(1) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act makes an owner or operator of a
53. See id.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1978).
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discharging vessel15 strictly liable56 for cleanup costs. Liability can be
avoided, however, if the owner or operator can prove that the discharge
was caused solely by one or a combination of 1) an act of God, 2) an
act of war, 3) negligence on the part of the government, or 4) an act or
omission of a third party, whether or not negligent. 57
Similarly, the Civil Liability Convention subjects a shipowner to
strict liability for any pollution damage caused by oil discharged from
the ship as a result of an incident.5 8 "Pollution damage" includes the
cost of preventive measures, 59 which are "any reasonable measures
taken by any person after an incident has occurred to prevent or mini-
mize pollution damage."' 0 No liability attaches however if the owner
can prove that the damage 1) resulted from an act of war, 2) resulted
from a natural disaster of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible
character, 3) was wholly caused by any act or omission done with in-
tent to cause damage by a third party, or 4) was wholly caused by the
negligence or other wrongful act of any Government in the exercise of
its responsibility to maintain navigational aids.6'
Under the Civil Liability Convention, an event from one of the
four classes must cause "the damage"'62 in order to shield the owner
from liability. Under section 1321(f)(1), on the other hand, such an
event must cause "the discharge" in order for liability to be avoided.
With respect to the third party conduct and governmental negligence
exceptions this difference may be of little consequence, since the Con-
vention requires that damage be wholly caused by these events in order
for the exceptions to come into play. On the assumption that a dis-
charge must inevitably cause some damage in and of itself, these excep-
tions would not be available in any case where the discharge could not
be wholly attributed to governmental negligence or a third party's in-
tentional conduct.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1321()(1) (1978).
56. The term "strict liability" is used in this note to refer to liability which is imposed
without regard to the fault of the actor, but which does not attach ifthe actor can prove that
he comes within one or more specified exceptions to liability.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f(1) (1978). For expediency ofexposition, these exceptions will be
referred to respectively as the act of war, act of God, governmental negligence, and third
party conduct exceptions.
58. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 1.
59. Id. art. I, § 6.
60. Id. art. I, § 7.
61. Id. art. III, §§ 2(a)-(c). For expediency of exposition, these exceptions will be re-
ferred to respectively as the act of war, natural phenomenon, third party conduct, and gov-
ernmental negligence exceptions.
62. .d. art. III,§ 2.
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It appears from the foregoing that the "damage"-"discharge" dif-
ference between the Convention and Section 1321(f)(1) would gener-
ally work to trigger the third party conduct and governmental
negligence exceptions under the Convention in situations in which they
would not be triggered under Section 1321(f)(1). But it is possible (if
unlikely) that in some situations this difference could have the opposite
effect. Suppose, for example, that a tanker runs aground, developing a
minor leak, solely because the government misplaced a navigational
aid. The captain, in an effort to refloat the vessel, exacerbates the leak,
causing increased spillage. Clearly, the captain has caused additional
damage; the owner therefore cannot escape liability under the Conven-
tion, because the damage was not "wholly" caused by the governmen-
tal negligence. But may the owner escape liability under Section
1321(f)(1)? Has the captain helped to cause the discharge, or has he
merely caused additional damage? A "discharge" includes, but is not
limited to, any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
or dumping.6 3 The owner might argue that the "spilling" or "leaking"
was caused solely by the governmental negligence, and the captain's
negligence merely exacerbated (e.g., an increase in the rate or amount)
the spilling. It would appear, however, that the definition of discharge
does not reasonably admit of so subtle a distinction. The only reason-
able interpretation of "spilling" or "leaking" would seem to be that
they refer to a unitary event, continuous over time, which begins with
the initial leakage of oil and ends when such leakage completely ceases.
Anything which in-the interim contributes to the leakage must be said
to be a cause of a "spilling" or "leaking". In simple terms, in the hypo-
thetical under consideration, there has been by any account a "spilling"
or "leaking" of oil, and the captain's negligence was in part a cause of
it. 64
The Convention's act of war and natural phenomenon exceptions
are not limited on their face to situations in which the damage results
wholly from these events. Thus, if a discharge was followed, for exam-
ple, by an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible phenomenon, the
owner could conceivably argue that he should be exempted from liabil-
ity to the extent that the phenomenon exacerbated the damage. Such
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (1978).
64. If the captain has not contributed to the "spilling," then what has he done? If a
"spilling" is to be distinguished from "additional spilling," then the situation presents not
one but two discharges: one "discharge" caused by the governmental negligence, and an
"additional discharge" caused by the captain's negligence. The problems of allocating lia-
bility presented by such an analysis seem insoluble.
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an argument would not be open to an owner under Section 1321(f)(1),
since the natural phenomenon was in no way the cause of the dis-
charge, let alone its "sole" cause.
Turning to the exceptions themselves, it appears from a cursory
comparison that they are somewhat narrower (and, correlatively, the
scope of liability somewhat broader) under the Civil Liability Conven-
tion than under Section 1321(f)(1). While this preliminary conclusion
remains generally true, a closer analysis indicates that it may not be
entirely accurate for each exception when it is applied to the question
of recoverability of government cleanup costs for high seas oil pollu-
tion.
The Convention's natural phenomenon exception was apparently
intended to be more limited than the act of God exception found in
Section 1321(f)(1). 6" As originally drafted, the exception encompassed
"a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character." '66 This language
is similar to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's definition of an
"act of God": an act occasioned by an unanticipated natural disaster.67
The present language was apparently the result of a compromise.68
The key word in the present definition is "irresistible." Some have ad-
vanced the view that this requirement obligates the owner, in order to
prevail under the exception, to prove not only that the accident could
not have been avoided by the shipmaster's exercise of reasonable care,
but that it could not have been avoided by anyone under any circum-
stances.69 If this interpretation is correct, then the Convention's natural
phenomenon exception is clearly more limited than the Section
1321(f)(1) act of God exception.
The governmental negligence exception, unlimited under Section
1321(f)(1), is limited under the Civil Liability Convention to negligence
by the government in its exercise of a responsiblity to maintain naviga-
tional aids.7" As applied to the question of recovery of high seas pollu-
tion damage, however, this difference may be of little consequence.
Under Article III, paragraph 3 of the Civil Liability Convention, "If
the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the
person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person,
65. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 1, at 182-183.
66. LEG/CONF/4, OR 437 at 460, Sept. 1969.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12) (1976).
68. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 1, at 182-183.
69. See id. at 183.
70. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 2(c).
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the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to
such person." In a suit brought to recover its cleanup costs, the govern-
ment is "the person who has suffered the damage." The negligent con-
duct in Article 111(3) is not limited to the activity of maintaining
navigational aids. Moreover, the owner's exoneration under this article
is not contingent on the victim's negligence being wholly the cause of
the damage. The net effect is that, when the government is seeking
recovery of its cleanup costs, the potential scope of the owner's liability
will be narrower under the Convention than under Section 1321(f)(1),
since under the latter the owner may not even partially escape liability
unless it shows that the governmental negligence was the sole cause of
the discharge.
The Civil Liability Convention's third party conduct exception be-
comes operative only when the damage is wholly caused by a third
party act or omission done with intent to cause damage.7 1 In contrast,
the owner may escape liability under Section 1321(f)(1) whenever a
third party's act or omission is the sole cause of the discharge, "without
regard to whether any such act was or was not negligent"; the culpabil-
ity of the third party conduct is irrelevant under Section 1321(f)(1).
Section 1321(f)(1) obviously provides a broader third party conduct ex-
ception than does the Convention.
This result is particularly significant in view of the fact that neither
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act nor the Civil Liability Con-
vention imposes liability on the responsible third party for expenses
incurred under the Intervention on the High Seas Act or the Interven-
tion Convention, The Clean Water Act amended Section 1321(d) to
provide that any cost incurred under the Intervention on the High Seas
Act or the Intervention Convention shall be a cost incurred by the gov-
ernment "for the purposes of subsection (f) in the removal of
oil. .... -"2 Subsection (f) imposes strict liability on the owner or oper-
ator. No parallel amendment was made for subsection (g) of Section
1321, which imposes strict liability on a third party in cases where the
owner or operator successfully proves that such third party solely
caused a discharge "into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States."73 Therefore, if the owner or operator of a vessel discharging
oil onto the high seas successfully avoids liability under Section
1321(f)(1) by proving the discharge was caused solely by a third party,
the government is left without a statutory remedy under the Federal
71. Id. art. III, § 2(b).
72. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1978).
73. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1978).
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Water Pollution Control Act for its costs incurred under the Interven-
tion on the High Seas Act.
The absence of any third party liability under both the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and the Civil Liability Convention accen-
tuates the significance of the difference between the two liability re-
gimes with respect to the third party conduct exception. Since this
defense is markedly narrower under the Convention than under Sec-
tion 1321(f)(1), the government will go uncompensated in a greater
number of third party conduct situations under Section 1321(f)(1) than
under the Convention.74
The Convention's act of war exception exempts from liability an
owner who proves that the damage resulted from "an act of war, hostil-
ities, civil war, insurrection. . . ." This language is broader on its
face than the counterpart language under Section 1321(0(1), which is
limited simply to an "act of war."76 It is possible, however, that an "act
of war" will be construed under Section 1321(0(1) so as to encompass
the additional events enumerated in the Convention exception; indeed,
most of the activities that these events suggest would certainly seem to
qualify as acts of war if undertaken by a government. To the extent
that the Convention's exception might include such activities as acts of
terrorism, which might not fall within the Section 1321(0(1) act of war
exception, it would seem likely that an owner or operator could never-
theless escape liability under that section by asserting the third party
conduct exception.
In general, the exceptions to liability are narrower under the Civil
Liability Convention, thus providing for a broader scope of liability.
The "damage"-"discharge" distinction between the two regimes
74. It is noteworthy, however, that in suits brought in other contexts courts have applied
the third party conduct exception only grudgingly. In a suit brought by the government to
recover its costs for cleaning up oil discharged into the navigable waters of the United States
(33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)), it was held that the negligence of a compulsory pilot, who was
required under Maine law to assist pilotage of a Norwegian supertanker into port, was not
an "act or omission of a third party," under section 1321(0(1), and thus, did not bring the
owner within the exception. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977). 33
U.S.C. § 1321(i)(1) allows an owner or operator of a discharging vessel or onshore facility to
recover from the government reasonable costs incurred for voluntarily removing the spill
itself if it can prove that it comes within the third party conduct exception. But even when
the discharge is the result of an intentional act by a third party, it has been held that in order
to establish that the third party conduct was solely responsible for the discharge the claimant
must prove that reasonable actions were taken to prevent or forestall the third party inter-
vention. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. United States, 575 F.2d 839 (CL CL 1978).
75. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 2(a).
76. This is not a defined term under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 etseq. (1976).
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might in some cases allow an owner to restrict the extent of damage for
which he may be liable under the Convention. Such cases are likely to
arise, if at all, only in very unusual circumstances. The natural phe-
nomenon and third party conduct exceptions clearly impose a broader
scope of liability under the Convention than do their counterparts
under Section 1321(f)(1). The act of war exception, broader in terms
under the Convention, is unlikely to prove broader in application.
Only the governmental negligence exception is likely to allow owners
to escape liability more often under the Convention than under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act by virtue of the fact that an owner
can exonerate itself from liability to the extent that it proves the gov-
ernment was a negligent victim under Article 111(3).
C. Types of Damages Recoverable
Z Nature of Injuries Which are Compensable
Section 1321(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act now
makes any expense incurred under the Intervention on the High Seas
Act or the Intervention Convention "a cost incurred by the United
States Government for the purposes of subsection (f) in the removal of
oil. . . ."I' "Removal" refers to removal of the oil, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage
to the public health or welfare, including but not limited to fish, shell-
fish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines and
beaches.7" However, subdivison (4) of Section 1321(f) further provides
that costs of removal "shall include any costs or expenses incurred by
the Federal Government or any State government in the restoration or
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed" as a result of
the discharge. The effect of these provisions is to allow recovery of
costs which go far beyond those incurred for "removal" as that term
would normally be understood.
The Civil Liability Convention subjects the owner to liability for
any "pollution damage."79 The term is defined to mean "loss or dam-
age caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting
from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape
or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures
and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures."8 0 The re-
77. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1978).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(8) (1976).
79. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 1.
80. Id. art. I, § 6.
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quirement of contamination probably excludes damage from oil which
subsequently ignites." The meaning of the word "loss," as qualified by
the words "by contamination," is unclear, and raises doubt as to the
recoverability of consequent economic loss (for example, a fisherman's
lost profits) as well as to the recoverability of costs of cleaning oiled
wildlife.8 2 Certainly the latter would be recoverable under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as a cost of other action necessary to mini-
mize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, which explic-
itly includes wildlife,83 while consequent economic loss would not be
recoverable.
i Compensationfor the Cost of Preventive Measures Taken Prior to
a Discharge
Measures may be taken under the Intevention on the High Seas
Act and the Intervention Convention in response to a danger "from
pollution or threat ofpollution. . . which may reasonably be expected
to result in major harmful consequences."84 Neither "pollution" nor
"threat of pollution" are defined, but the language clearly seems to con-
fer a right of intervention if there is a threat of pollution, even if there
has been no discharge. Assuming this to be the case, a major issue
emerges as to whether anticipatory measures taken in response to a
threat of pollution but prior to an actual discharge are compensable
under the Civil Liability Convention and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. This issue has considerable practical significance, since
prompt initiation of cleanup activities is generally considered an im-
portant factor in mitigating the oil pollution damage resulting from a
vessel spill.85
a. Compensation for the Cost of Anticipatory Measures under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides for compensa-
tion for costs of anticipatory measures. The Clean Water Act amend-
ments now make "[aJny expense" incurred under the Intervention on
the High Seas Act or the Intervention Convention a cost incurred by
81. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 1, at 110, 185.
82. Id. at 185.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(8) (1976).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1978) (emphasis added).
85. See FWPCA Amendment Hearings, supra note 2, at 522-523 (statement of Rear
Adm. G.H. Patrick Bursley).
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the government for the purposes of Section 1321 (f)(1).86 The Interven-
tion on the High Seas Act authorizes measures to be taken in response
to a mere threat of pollution. 7 Section 1474(1) of the High Seas Act
specifically authorizes the government to "coordinate and direct all
public and private efforts directed at the removal or elimination of the
threatened pollution damage."8 This language seems clearly intended
to provide compensation for actions taken when there is a threat of
pollution irrespective of whether there has been a discharge.
b. Compensation for the Cost of Anticipatory Measures Under the
Civil Liability Convention
The language of the Civil Liability Convention is ambiguous on
the question of whether the cost of anticipatory measures taken by a
coastal state prior to an actual discharge is recoverable. The Conven-
tion subjects a shipowner to liability for pollution damage,89 which in-
cludes the cost of preventive measures and further loss or damage
caused by preventive measures.9 "Preventive measures" are "any rea-
sonable measures taken by any person after an incident has occurred to
prevent or minimize pollution .damage."9  An "incident," in turn, is
"any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin, which
causes pollution damage."9 2 Returning to the definition of "pollution
damage," it is "loss or damage caused outside the ship . . . resulting
from the escape or discharge of oil."93
It has been suggested that the effect of these provisions is "that [the
cost of] any measure taken before oil actually spills from the ship [is]
irrecoverable under [the Convention]. So, if a ship has been stranded
but no oil has spilled, the cost of sending out boats with detergent
spraying capability, and of laying booms and of other such measures,
will be irrecoverable."94 The thrust of the argument is that if there has
been a stranding but no escape or discharge of oil, there has been no
"pollution damage," if there has been no pollution damage, there has
been no "incident." And if there has been no incident, any measures
taken could not have been taken "after an incident has occurred."
86. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1978) (emphasis added).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1978).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1474(1) (1976).
89. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 1.
90. Id. art. I, § 6.
91. Id. art. I, § 7.
92. Id. art. I, § 8.
93. Id. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
94. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 1, at 186.
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Thus, anticipatory measures are not "preventive measures," and conse-
quently are not within the scope of liability.
This argument turns on the definition of "incident." It seems safe
to assume that a stranding is an "occurrence" as that term is used in
Article 1(8) to define "incident." If the occurrence (stranding) subse-
quently results in a discharge, there is "pollution damage", and conse-
quently an "incident." Thus, the broad issue is whether anticipatory
measures--those taken after the stranding but prior to the discharge-
qualify a5 measures taken "after an incident has occurred" (i.e., "pre-
ventive measures"), the cost of which is subject to compensation under
Article III(1). On the one hand, it seems clear that an occurrence which
has not yet resulted in a discharge is hardly an "incident" as that term
is defined. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that a stranding
which results in a discharge of oil is an "occurrence. . . which causes
pollution damage," regardless of whether the oil is discharged immedi-
ately upon stranding or sometime thereafter. The broad issue of
whether anticipatory measures are "preventive measures" thus narrows
to the question of whether an occurrence which subsequently causes
pollution damage is to be construed as an "incident" 1) from the mo-
ment it occurs, or 2) only from the moment that it causes pollution
damage. Implicit in the argument concluding that anticipatory meas-
ures are not compensable is the assumption that the correct construc-
tion is the first one: an occurrence is an incident only from the moment
it results in a discharge. But the second construction seems equally de-
fensible, and no a priori grounds appear for resolving the ambiguity in
favor of one over the other. Indeed, at least three considerations mili-
tate against the first construction and in favor of the second.
1. First, the Official Records of the Brussels Conference suggests
that the drafters of the Convention intended an occurrence to be an
incident from the moment it occurred. The Netherlands raised the is-
sue of the ambiguity in the definition of "incident," although in a dif-
ferent context:
Supposing a tanker has stranded on a beach and storms or unsuccess-
fil salvage operations cause her to break up after four days, as a
result of which oil escapes and damage is inflicted. Would the first
occurrence, i.e. the stranding of the ship be covered by the definition
or would the breaking up be the relevant fact? For the possible con-
sequences of this difference in interpretation, see observation on Arti-
cle II.95
95. LEG/CONF/4/OR 437 at 455, Sept. 1969.
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Subparagraph (1) of Article II (Article III in the final draft) at that time
read: "The owner shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by
oil that has escaped or been discharged from his shofp .... -96 The
Netherlands' concern was with the consequence of a change in owner-
ship between the time of stranding and the time of discharge. This
concern was manifested in The Netherlands' observation on the origi-
nal Article II:
It follows from the words "from his ship" that the liable owner will
be the owner of the ship at the moment of escape or discharge. To
avoid the complications in the case given by the Netherlands com-
ment on [the definition of "incident"], resulting from a change of
ownership between the moment of stranding and the moment of es-
cape, which may follow after a few days when the ship breaks up, the
drafting should be revised.97
Subsequently, the draft was revised. The evolution of the language is
instructive in ascertaining its intended purpose.
The Netherlands first proposed the following language: "The
owner at the time of the incident shall be liable for any pollution dam-
age caused by oil which has escaped or was discharged from his
ship .. ."98 The United States suggested the following amendment to
clarify the purpose of the provision:
The owner of a ship at the time of an incident or where the incident
consists of a series of occurrences at the time of the first such occur-
rence shall except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 be liable for any
pollution damage caused by oil that has escaped or been discharged
from his ship as a result of the incident. 99
The United States commented:
The purpose of this amendment is to make it clear that the per-
son to be liable for oil pollution is the owner at the time an incident
occurs. It is important that the position should be clarified when an
incident comprises more than one occurrence and the proposed
amendment covers this case. l°°
Draft Articles prepared by the Secretariat embodied the United
States' proposal after dropping the phrase "as a result of the inci-
dent"."' Subsequently, the phrase was reinstated, and the language as
96. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 461-462 (emphasis in original).
98. LEG/CONF/4/Add.6, OR 543 at 544, 19 Nov. 1969.
99.. LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.10, OR 567, 20 Nov. 1969.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.22/Rev. 1, OR 582 at 583, 20 Nov. 1969.
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it now appears in Article III(1) of the Convention is, with the exception
of minor syntactical changes, identical with that proposed by the
United States. Under the Convention, then, the person liable for pollu-
tion damage is the owner "at the time of an incident." The Nether-
lands recognized the ambiguity in the phrase "the time of an incident"
arising from the ambiguity in the definition of "incident": the phrase
could be interpreted to mean the time of an occurrence or the time
when an occurrence resulted in a discharge. As a result, language was
added to clarify the phrase: in the case of a series of occurrences, "the
time of an incident" was to be interpreted as the "time of the first such
occurrence." In other words, the drafters intended "incident" to mean
the occurence at the time it occurred, not at the time oil was discharged.
2. The second consideration favoring the interpretation that an
incident is an occurrence from the moment it occurs is one of econom-
ics. To the extent that anticipatory measures result in more effective
prevention, their encouragement would, in the long run, inure to the
benefit of the shipowner as well as the coastal state. Conversely, if an-
ticipatory measures are excluded from liability, any resulting savings to
the shipowner will be diminished (and perhaps consumed) by the
amount of any additional damage resulting from the coastal state's fail-
ure to take such measures. Under this analysis, two reasons suggest
that the shipowner has much to gain and little to lose from the inclu-
sion of anticipatory measures within the scope of liability.
First, the cost of taking anticipatory measures is not compensable
if a discharge never occurs, for there has been no "incident" at all. For
example, if a coastal state successfully salvages the imminently-
threatened oil cargo of a stranded tanker by pumping it out of the
ship's hold before a leak develops, the shipowner would not only avoid
liability for the pollution damage that was entirely averted, but because
such damage was entirely averted, he would also avoid liability for the
successful offloading. In addition, the cargo owner (or perhaps his in-
surance carrier) would receive the benefit of having the cargo pre-
served. Under the Convention, the only loss would fall on the coastal
state, for it would have to bear the cost of the offloading. This result-
clearly required under the Civil Liability Convention-graphically il-
lustrates the inequities that can arise under such a liability scheme.
Under the Convention, anticipatory measures which are truly "preven-
tive" in the sense of preventing any discharge whatsoever would benefit
all involved except the person taking the measures. Nevertheless,
under the present scheme the shipowner's position is not compromised
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in the slightest by a coastal state's anticipatory measures unless a dis-
charge actually develops.
Second, even if a discharge does develop, the shipowner's position
is impaired only if the cost of the anticipatory measures exceeds the
amount of additional damages thereby avoided. To the extent that the
additional damages averted by the anticipatory measures exceed the
cost of those measures, both the shipowner and the coastal state (and
possibly the cargo owner) have been benefited.1"'
3. The final consideration bearing on the interpretation of "inci-
dent" involves its use in the definition of preventive measures. "Pre-
ventive measures" are "any reasonable measures taken . . . after an
incident has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage.""°3 It
bears note that a measure which is taken after an occurrence results in
pollution damage is inaptly described as "preventive."
iii Summary Damages Recoverable
The types of damages recoverable under the Civil Liability Con-
vention and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act appear to be sub-
stantially similar. There is some doubt as to the Convention's coverage
of oiled wildlife." 4 There is apparently also some question as to its
coverage of anticipatory measures taken after a threat of pollution has
arisen, but prior to an actual discharge. Noncoverage of such measures
would be a major infirmity of the Convention not shared by the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The significant differences with respect to the scope of liability
provided by the Civil Liability Convention and by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act may be summarized as follows. The significant
differences which create a broader liability under the Civil Liability
Convention include:
A. Geographical scope: The Civil Liability Convention compen-
sates a coastal state for the cost of preventive measures taken on its
102. Even if anticipatory measures are excluded from liability, the shipowner will come
out ahead if the coastal state determines that it is to its own advantage to take and pay for
anticipatory measures rather than bear the brunt of avoidable, albeit compensable, addi-
tional damages. The shipowner is saved the expense of both the measures and the addi-
tional damage. Such an outcome is at best unfair; the shipowner is getting the best of a bad
situation that he created.
103. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
104. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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territorial waters as well as on the high seas when a discharge occurs on
the high seas. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act compensates
the government for the cost of cleaning up oil discharged into or upon
the navigable waters of the United States,10 5 and for the cost of inter-
vention measures taken on the high seas under the Intervention on the
High Seas Act."0 6 The Act apparently does not cover the situation
where measures are taken on the territorial sea to remove oil initially
discharged on the high seas.
B. Protected class: The Convention provides for liability to any
person who undertakes preventive measures. 07 The Act provides for
liability only to the government.' 8
C. Naturalphenomenon exception: To come within this excep-
tion under the Convention, a shipowner must prove that the natural
phenomenon was "irresistible."" This is a more stringent require-
ment than its counterpart under the Act, which obligates the owner to
prove that the discharge resulted from an act occasioned by an unantic-
ipated and grave natural disaster. 10
D. Thirdparty conduct exception: To escape liability under this
exception, the Act requires the owner or operator to prove merely that
the discharge was caused solely by the third party's conduct, without
regard to the degree of culpability."' Under the Convention, the ex-
ception is available only if the owner proves that the third party acted
intentionally. 112
The significant differences creating broader liability under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act include:
A. Type of discharging vessel: The Convention applies only to
discharges from ships actually carrying oil as cargo."t 3 Thus, pollution
damage caused by discharges from empty tankers and nontankers is
not covered. Such damage is covered under the Act. In general appli-
cation, this difference results in a scope of liability that is profoundly
more restricted under the Convention than under the Act. But as ap-
plied to the situation of intervention on the high seas pursuant to the
Intervention on the High Seas Act or the Intervention Convention, this
105. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(3), (f)(1) (1978).
106. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(d), (f)(1) (1978).
107. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, arts. I §§ 2, 7 and III, § 1.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1978).
109. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. Ill, § 2(a).
110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a)(12), (f)(1) (1978).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1978).
112. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 2(b).
113. Id. art. I, § 1.
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difference is not nearly as important. Both of these latter two codifica-
tions require a maritime casualty before the right of intervention may
be exercised. 14 Because loaded oil tankers probably account for virtu-
ally all of the oil spilled into the sea as the result of accidental dis-
charges,' 5 the Convention will be available in most situations to
compensate for the costs of high seas intervention.
B. Governmental negligence exception: This exception is nar-
rower on its terms under the Convention and would thus probably pro-
vide for broader liability in its general application. But with regard to
the problem of the government's recovery of its intervention and
cleanup costs, the Convention provides for narrower liability. This is
true because in such a situation shipowners may take advantage of a
provision which allows them to exonerate themselves from liability to
the extent that the victim's (here, the government's) damage was the
result of its own negligence'16
C. Preventive measures: There is apparently some difference of
opinion as to whether the cost of what has been referred to herein as
anticipatory measures is compensable under the Convention. 117 Such
measures are compensable under the Act." 8 To the extent that their
cost is not recoverable under the Convention, the Act provides for sig-
nificantly broader liability. However, there appear to be strong argu-
ments for the contention that the costs of such measures are subject to
compensation under the Convention.
The foregoing summary suggests that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act imposes broader liability in most vessel-source oil pollu-
tion cases. The pivotal fact supporting this conclusion is that the Con-
vention applies only to ships carrying oil as cargo. But the practical
significance of this fact is greatly diminished when application is re-
stricted to the situation where the government seeks its costs of inter-
vention and cleanup following a maritime casualty on the high seas.
As a result, in this restricted situation, the scope of liability is likely to
prove broader under the Convention than under the Act. This conclu-
sion is almost undeniable if the contention that the cost of anticipatory
measures is compensable under the Convention is accepted.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1978); Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. I.
115. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
116. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. III, § 3.
117. See text accompanying notes 88-102 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 85-97 supra.
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